THE WORK OF THE ULATION POLICIES COMMITTEE*

By FRANÇOIS LAFITTE

e Population Policies Com- nd its forerunner, the Popula- vestigation Committee, owe n to the inspiration of Pro- Carr-Saunders. His Galton "Eugenics in the Light of rends" † was responsible for a new trend of thought in . He stressed the fact that this no longer, as in the past, afford self with the quality of the the exclusion of considerations mbers. He urged that it should itself the nickname "The he Detection of Persons Un- Posterity" by failing to develop of positive eugenics as impor- concrete as its programme of nics. In view of the emergence blic issue of the problem of the our population, he warned the danger of allowing the initiative population policy to be taken es and institutions who might mselves with the problem of hout considering at the same blem of quality.

uit of Professor Carr-Saunders's ddress was a series of discussions imately to the institution, on of this *Society*, of the Popula- tion Committee, for the purpose our population trends, past and of studying the influences which . The Investigation Committee rily a fact-finding body, and has le work in elucidating the *how* trends. But it is also con- diagnosis, with the *why* of nds, and, at this point, its work that of the Population Policies

Formation of Committee

This Committee was brought into existence in the spring of 1938, again on the initiative of the *Eugenics Society*, with the object of complementing the work of the Investigation Committee by tackling the vital question of remedies—of measures to "prevent the decline of the population from proceeding faster or further than may be deemed socially desirable." Whilst the Investigation Committee is primarily concerned with ascertaining facts, the Policies Committee is primarily interested in devising remedies; both Committees are concerned with the diagnosis of causes.

The reasons which led the *Society* to take the first steps in establishing this new Committee were admirably stated by Professor Carr-Saunders in his Galton Lecture:

> The coming decline is as yet hidden from the people at large. Prophecy is dangerous; but it needs no courage to foretell that, once the decline in numbers becomes apparent, universal interest and concern will be aroused in the population problem. This problem may well assume first place among public questions, and put in the shade those economic and social matters which now occupy attention. Discussion will lead ultimately to action, and this is the point to which I wish to draw special attention. . . . If eugenists set to work now and formulate a policy designed to lift the birth-rate, they will be first in the field. Under such circumstances their proposals will at least obtain sympathetic attention and may well be adopted in whole or in part. Such proposals will possess the great merit of having been formulated with the problem of quality as well as the problem of quantity in mind. But if they delay, measures will be proposed by others who have quantity alone in mind, and the nation will get committed to a population policy in which eugenic considerations find no place. . . . The *Society* has an opportunity which is never likely to recur. Everyone will soon be asking what can be done. A population policy will certainly be constructed; now is the time to ensure that it will be a policy in which eugenic considerations are not omitted.*

before the *Eugenics Society* on

view, 1935, 27, 11.

* *loc. cit.*, 17.

And so the Population Policies Committee was established, by this *Society* and P.E.P. jointly, in the hope that its discussions of the factors involved in the framing of a positive population policy and its sifting of the experience of foreign countries in this respect would result in the formulation of proposals which could not be ignored when, in due course, national opinion became ripe for action to be taken.

The Committee, under the chairmanship of Professor N. F. Hall, Director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, includes among its members Professor Carr-Saunders, Dr. C. P. Blacker, D. V. Glass, Mrs. Eva Hubback, and Mr. Max Nicholson, Secretary of P.E.P. Five of its members are also members of the Population Investigation Committee, so that co-ordination with that body is ensured.

Immediate aims of Committee

The Committee's immediate aim is to make a preliminary survey of the field of positive policies, and to embody the results in a fairly detailed report, discussing pros and cons at some length. This report it is hoped to publish in April of next year. This is regarded as the first stage. After the publication of the report, according to its reception by the public and the attitude to it of the various organizations which are feeling their way toward acceptance of the necessity of a population policy, it may be decided to reconstitute the Committee on a broader basis, to undertake more detailed investigations and possibly to work for the implementing of any generally agreed proposals. Nothing concrete can be said on this point at the present stage.

Our work since June of last year has been concerned with three main topics:

(1) the position of the family on unemployment pay;
(2) family allowances;
(3) a diagnosis of the causes of the fall in fertility.

We are now about to embark upon a series of discussions of the general aims and principles of a population policy, and will later pass on to a consideration of s measures.

Position of families on relief

Why did we begin with a study financial position of families on unem ment pay? Partly because, since the s we are tackling is both vast and som elusive, we preferred to start on an asp it the facts of which are fairly easily a tainable and concrete; partly because a study throws indirectly a good deal of upon the financial aspects of child-re among manual workers generally. analysis, some of the results of which recently published in the EUGENICS REVI led us to two main conclusions. that unemployment pay, whether be or assistance, becomes progressively adequate for human needs as the size of dependent family increases. In other wo unemployment pay, in spite of its n basis, tends to reproduce, at a lower l one of the weaknesses of the present w system—its failure to ensure to familie different sizes an income commensurate their needs, its financial penalization parenthood.

We found further that a substantial portion of the children in unemplo families must be living in circumsta below any commonly accepted "pov line," and that this position is not con to families on unemployment pay. In case of large families a considerable "o lap" between normal wage-rates and employment pay was found to exist. I precisely because this "overlap" ex because the scale of unemployment pa circumscribed by present wage levels an the inflexibility of the wage-system, t even such a service as Unemploym Assistance, specifically designed to sup income in accordance with need, can avoid some penalization of the large fam

Financial position of dependent family

This study convinced us of the necessi of considering the financial position of t

* F. Lafitte: "Unemployment and Child-bearin EUGENICS REVIEW, 1939, 30, 275.

family in general, and the merits its of family allowance schemes as r method of redistributing income way as to eliminate or mitigate, *at e level*, the financial bonus which t wage-system bestows upon the r the relatively infertile. It was that, in so far as married couples families for financial reasons, the nomic bonus on infertility must by a redistribution of income in parents. On this principle there agreement. Income, unlike the family, is not elastic. Are family the best or the only method of this inelasticity of income? A tailed discussions of this topic left ed. We had to consider, on the the apparent failure of the family systems in France and Belgium to influence the birth-rate, and te rejection of cash allowances in h population policy, as an ex- easure which might have un- nsequences. On the other hand the experience of Germany in where the birth-rate has risen, is not clear to what extent cash have contributed to this rise. re was the argument that cash may have had no appreciable reign countries because they are n an "adequate" scale; larger ought to stimulate births.

up against two difficulties: (*a*) cide the size of an "adequate" l relation to an income of a given how to raise the money for allow- "adequate" scale. On neither ny definite decision been taken. sideration of the matter has been two reasons.

st place we have come to realize re many methods apart from cash by which the desired redistribu- me might be effected. It was t advisable first to make a study ncies by which income is or may from the childless to the parents. s include direct and indirect cial insurances, social services, rebates and differential pricing schemes. The operation of all these agencies in combination requires to be considered before it will be possible to determine what importance to attach to cash allowances in respect of children in a reconstructed system of taxation, social insurance and social services. One thing at any rate has become clear to us: that family endowment in the sense solely of cash allowances cannot be regarded as a panacea for the population problem, nor even necessarily as the simplest and most effective method of relieving the burden of parenthood. A clearly thought-out population policy will probably include cash allowances in some shape or form among its measures, but it will include them as one element in an integrated system of measures rather than as the main plank of its programme.

Our second reason for postponing a decision about family allowances was that our work had made us keenly aware of the necessity of considering the motives behind family limitation, and the social factors that underlie those motives. To what extent are families limited for financial reasons rather than on less tangible grounds, and what exactly are the financial reasons involved?

Motives behind family limitation

A diagnosis of causes was therefore our next task, and it is proving to be an immensely complex undertaking. As Dr. Blacker and Mr. Glass remark in a recent publication:

> Many people are in the habit of putting forward on this subject opinions which are based on personal problems which happen to be occupying their minds at the time, or on preconceived political theories. Here are some of the separate "causes" which various people who have written to the papers regard as accounting, singly or exclusively, for the whole problem: fear of another world war; the inadequate wages paid to the working man; the cost and difficulty of obtaining domestic servants; the craze for amusement and pleasures; the "pace" of modern life; over-indulgence by the modern girl in athletics; the danger of dying in childbirth; the increase of homosexuality among men; the selfishness of the modern girl; the demoralizing influence of towns. It has been well remarked that "hardly one of the opinions arrived at in this 'intuitional' fashion will bear

examination." The problem is not so simple and straightforward as many people seem to think. Different causes are at work which, in various combinations, affect people in different occupations and in different parts of the country in many complicated ways about which we should know more.

The more closely the problem is studied, the clearer does it become that, in fact, the causes of the decline in fertility are numerous, complex and deep-seated. In western European countries they form so intimate a part of what we may call the twentieth-century view of life, that we can prophesy with some confidence that really effective counter measures will not be easy to find. The raising of our national fertility would, in fact, prove a gigantic task, the achievement of which would necessitate a drastic revision of many of our current ideas about wages, social services, the economic system and the family.*

Nevertheless, in order to see the problem in its right perspective, and to achieve at any rate a first approximation to a correct assessment of the relative importance of the main factors discouraging fertility, it is necessary to attempt such a diagnosis. Without it we cannot hope to devise a realistic or an adequate policy.

The birth-rate has been falling for the past sixty years, and one thing at least is clear: that by far the most important reason for this is the fact that people have to an increasing extent consciously sought to avoid having large families. The problem is basically one of volition, of the motives of married couples, of attitudes to parenthood. What we have to find out is why in the 'seventies of last century there developed a new attitude to parenthood which was unfavourable to fertility. It is not a sufficient explanation to state merely that the publicity given to the idea of family limitation by the birth-control trials of the late 'seventies led people to realize the possibilities of avoiding large families . . . and so the birth-rate fell. That is of course true, but it is not the whole truth. For the revival of the birth-control movement at that time, after a period of quiescence lasting some thirty years, was itself a response to the growth of a new attitude of parenthood. What developments in our social life in mid-Victorian times and since have brought about this cha outlook, this ever-extending desire to family responsibilities? The attem answer this question involved us sociological analysis of British life ov past hundred years. Since this anal still being considered by the Commit what follows I shall be expressing m sonal opinion rather than the final vi the Committee.

My own view of the basic factor in is somewhat complex. It seems to m the development of British society ov past hundred years—that is, sinc stabilization of the modern industrial —has awakened the great mass of pe the possibilities of high standards of and comfort, and thereby to a hither paralleled realization of wants, which only in part been satisfied. Since the quarter of last century the growth of of living seems to have outstripped growth of *actual standards* of living—t to say, an increasing proportion of p to-day perhaps the majority, have co expect more of what are called the " things of life " than they are ac getting. At the same time children have turned into a financial burden for th fourteen years of their existence. Fe has consequently been sacrificed to a gr determination to span the gap betwee *actual* standard and the *desired* stand living by individual effort to " get on to " make good." *

Effect of high economic and cultural sta

The great economic, social and cu expansion of Britain since the middle century has given us higher standar living, a multiplication of the variet comforts and luxuries, made possib mass-production, a growing richness possibilities of enjoying life, and abo the achievement of what has been ca " silent social revolution "—mass lit popular education, the " civilization,"

* Population and Fertility. See EUGENICS REVIEW, 1939, 30, 235.

* The phrase " the good things of life " a concept of a standard of living are intended include cultural and spiritual as well as m desiderata.

he mass of the people. These ts have resulted in a transforma- ial attitudes. As standards rose even faster. Economic and social s lagged behind the growth of r welfare and comfort. The less e more prosperous classes above e mode of living they strive to what they now enjoy tends to be but a foretaste of what they may the future, if they can only " get rld " by individual striving. To which is not unlike the phenome- go described by Arsène Dumont capillarity," children tend to be

g of standards has brought with tion of child labour, compulsory p to fourteen, and the enforce- her standards of child welfare and sponsibility, all developments weakened many of the old s to parenthood. Education and expansion of norms of living have o an ever greater awareness of the es of parenthood. Because people of life, both for themselves and ildren, they tend to have fewer t to care for them better, and tions which in the past would o barrier to fertility have to-day rted into barriers.

odern attitude to parenthood

ins of the modern attitude to can be traced back to mid- nes. The moral atmosphere of as dominated by the doctrine of which after all was in fact the cipation of M. Dumont's " social The " self-help " doctrine, tress upon individual enterprise, hought and hard work, was a ce in raising a large body of rkmen out of the social degrada- 'thirties and 'forties. " Self- ted the emergence of the typical man of the period, industrious, cation, ambitious to make his her by becoming his own master ating. Individual striving to " get on in life " was bound in the end to generate a critical attitude towards parenthood. " Self-help " implies saving, and children were becoming more and more costly.

Education in particular—a major instrument for competitive self-advancement—was becoming a heavy expense, not merely for the manual worker but in all classes. Throughout the second half of last century education was assuming an ever greater importance to the middle and upper classes, for reasons both of social prestige and of economic necessity, as Dr. Grace Leybourne so clearly demonstrated in an address to this *Society*.* Social progress was continually raising the standards of professional and educational qualifications, abolishing patronage and privilege in one sphere after another, throwing posts open to competitive examination, and making it necessary to educate daughters as well as sons. Moreover, every great step forward in working-class education had its influence upon the educational standards of the middle and upper classes. Education was turned into a necessity for all and the financial burden of parenthood thereby increased. What applies to education applies to many other things which have come to be regarded as necessities. To parents inspired with these new tastes the one obvious economy was to reduce the size of the family.

Stabilization of modern attitude

And so gradually the new attitude to parenthood was formed. It still had to become explicit and widely acceptable. Its wide acceptance was hindered by ignorance, the conventional morality, the lack of sex equality, and the unreflecting moral certainty of the age (typified in the dogmatic belief in " progress "). It required a social crisis to crystallize the new outlook and to make it respectable. The great depression, the economic crises and the land slump of the last quarter of the century provided the necessary shock. Victorian complacency was shaken. The thrifty workman was frightened. After

* EUGENICS REVIEW, 1938, **30**, 175.

a quarter of a century of unparalleled and practically undisturbed progress, uncertainty and *fear of falling back into the poverty he had barely escaped* replaced his earlier confident belief in automatic and inevitable economic advance. He had tasted the fruits of the new industrial order and he wanted more. In this situation the birth-control trials had the effect of a catalysing agent. The new attitude to parenthood was crystallized and made respectable. The trials gave fine publicity to contraception, but far greater was the publicity for the *idea* of family limitation. The trials constituted, as it were, a " show-down " between the conventional morality and the new outlook, and the old morality did not emerge unscathed. For the first time it became widely appreciated that children were not the inevitable consequence of marriage, and the idea spread that it might be right and proper to limit one's offspring.

For the wealthy too this was a period of transformation of values. Economic developments accomplished the eclipse of the social values of the landed gentry; henceforth it was money rather than land, birth or status which conferred prestige. The growth of " conspicuous expenditure " among the wealthy and the growing burden of education expenses to parents of the upper and middle classes must have provided strong reasons for family limitation.

Present-day determinants of family limitation

Once voluntary parenthood had gained a foothold, contraception ceased to be merely a *means* to family limitation, but became in addition a contributory *cause* of family limitation. The gradual diffusion of the idea of family limitation opened up new vistas to many who previously would have accepted the " devastating torrent of children " as part of the order of the universe. It was not difficult for people to discover hosts of new reasons for not wishing to have large families, and social emulation assisted in making the small family fashionable.

Subsequent developments have generalized and reinforced the new attitude. The " self-help " morality, expressing itself to-day in the urge to achieve security than independence, has penetrated al every rank of society. General edu the standardization of patterns of through the growth of towns, the b down of rural isolation and of indep rural life, the growth of opinion-f agencies on a national scale—the p press, the film, the radio—have gene in all classes the tendency always to little more, and to live a little abov means. There is probably more co ness to-day than in the past of t between the desired standard of liv actual financial possibilities.

Finally, the twentieth century has steady increase in the social importa section of the community which historically predisposed to low fertili great lower-middle class of black non-manual workers. The nature o work requires relatively high standa education and personal appearance, al in the mass their remuneration approx to that of skilled manual workers. sequently the tendency to live som above their means is perhaps chronic them, and they feel the pinch o norms and limited means with e keenness. Their importance as c exemplars for the mass of manual w must not be underestimated. Th respectable, everywhere in evidence, in the new suburbs and along the by- thronging the shopping centres. The look finds expression in the daily p They spend perhaps no more tha manual workers, but they spend their differently and to greater advantage. are looked up to, and their mode of life to become an ideal pattern for those be them.

Further factors in the problem

Such is my view of the main issue. are many additional factors which mu be overlooked, of which I think four r special notice.

1. Industrialism has resulted in w may describe as a far-reaching " sonalization " of work—the ine

large-scale production and the
of labour—and this has led, in
ditions, to a sharp division
nd leisure. Work means less
l than it did in the past, and
ortance is being attached to
t from *earning a living*. The
has become greatly enhanced,
reason and because of the
ty" accorded to the leisure
e wealthy by press and film.
rbanized and commercialized
vision of enjoyment has itself
dustry, and its products must
money. So that, to a certain
, because it involves the spend-
has become an alternative to

series of developments has
e earmarking in advance of a
ortion of income. Accurate
ot easy to obtain, but it seems
that the past fifty years have
growth of the proportion of
has to be written off in
fixed charges such as rent,
g expenses, house and hire-
ments, voluntary and com-
nce contributions, income tax,
The result is that a relatively
n of income is left over for
ture, including budgeting for
he family.
do not fit well into modern
h its street accidents, its lack
able open spaces, its lack of
adequate housing accommo-
on. Moreover children tend to
important kinds of leisure
it should be noted that this
tant not because towns to-day
le-in than the towns of last
ecause people expect and are
expect far more now than in

must refer to the growth of
d of sexual knowledge. The
ment of our society has
mily of its former importance,
extraverted social life. The
n reduced from an earning unit to a consuming unit dependent upon one main earner, it has lost a great part of its educational functions, and much of its leisure and recreational functions. Simultaneously increasing sex equality and sexual knowledge have enhanced the importance of the husband-wife relationship, often to the detriment of the parents-children relationship. As marriage becomes more and more a partnership of equals, the health and happiness of the married couple assume greater importance, and children tend to become a welcome, but not indispensable, addition to the happy marriage, rather than an integral part of it.

The formulation of policies

Such, in the baldest of outlines, are the main features of the problem as they strike me. What about policies? The Committee's next task is a discussion of the basic principles and general aims of a positive policy. After that we shall pass on to consideration of specific measures in detail, including cash allowances.

At this stage I can do no more than to indicate some of the main issues upon which we shall have to dwell. I cannot do better than to begin by recalling the way in which Professor Carr-Saunders has formulated the problem with which voluntary parenthood confronts us:

> Children were formerly the inevitable accompaniment of married companionship and home life. There was no question of any attitude to size of family; that settled itself. There was no thought of replacing the present generation; replacement was automatic. Children were a forced levy; now they are a voluntary contribution. But though size of family is now a matter of deliberation, replacement as yet plays no part in these deliberations. To how many people does it ever occur to connect the size of their family with the future of their country? No such notion ever enters the head of the man in the street.
>
> Voluntary contributions have, as we all know, to be earnestly solicited; but for these essential contributions there is as yet no solicitation on behalf of society. It is therefore a mistake to speak of a retreat from parenthood if by that is meant a deliberate refusal to replace the present generation. Replacement is not and never has been a conscious matter. But with a system of voluntary parenthood it must become so if

> society is to survive. . . . When children were a tax which could not be escaped by those who desired home life, the community, which relied upon this revenue for its perpetuation, was under no pressure to smooth the path for those who had to pay it. . . . Under a system of voluntary parenthood, however, the situation undergoes a profound change; the community now relies for its revenue upon voluntary contributions, and it must see, not only that obstacles do not stand in the path of contributors, but that all the resources of modern knowledge and skill are employed in order to assist those who take their share in the essential task of replacement.*

At every stage in the formulation of policy we are confronted with the need for making choices. At the outset we have to choose between the new system of voluntary contributions and the old system of enforced levies. I am certain that this *Society* shares the view of Professor Carr-Saunders that the achievement of voluntary parenthood is a great step forward in human history, and that it would be both mistaken and ineffective to attempt now to suppress birth-control. But accepting voluntary parenthood, do we *merely* accept it, or do we seek to foster and encourage it? Here there may be some difference of opinion. Professor Carr-Saunders argues that "parenthood must be made truly voluntary throughout society, in the sense that all births must become wanted births," but others might point out that at present the elimination of all unwanted births might result in an enormous fall in fertility. Every eugenist wishes to see knowledge of contraception and sexual hygiene disseminated as widely as possible. On the other hand it may be urged that it is better to soft-pedal contraception until the positive aspects of our policy begin to bear fruit. Here again a choice will have to be made.

"*Voluntary parenthood*" *as basis of policy*

Whatever we decide we must understand that there is a certain risk involved in basing our policy upon voluntary parenthood and wanted births. It means that we shall be relying upon freely given contributions, whilst doing all we can to make it easy for the contributors to make their offerin means in fact that we shall be relying the strength of the instinct to parent having removed the major obstacles expression.

Now while there is much evidence th philoprogenitive instinct is often thw we can none the less not be certain tha removal of the major obstacles to it pression would in itself suffice to mai our numbers. Moreover, in those cases an unwanted pregnancy results in a w child, the generalization of voluntary p hood would presumably prevent children from being conceived, by eli ing unwanted pregnancies.

For these reasons the removal of ob to parenthood must go hand in hand measures to enlighten and persuade to *want* more children. To borro analogy from another field, if the vol system of recruiting is to survive, must be made to see the need to ma work. Therefore I would agree with Pro Carr-Saunders that a positive popul policy must have two objects:

> first, to make it universally understood with a system of voluntary parenthood, a munity can only survive if participation task of replacement is undertaken as a n social duty, and secondly, to remove obs to, and to create facilities for, the fulfilm this duty.*

But I should disagree with his pu enlightenment and propaganda in the rather than in the second place. It i that over the past sixty years only on of the question has been put—namely case *against* fertility. Social develop public opinion, the continual inciteme expenditure that is a feature of m advertising, have all stated the case a fertility. The high-pressure salesma tended to supersede the parson as th stant visitor on the housewife's doo and he, unlike the parson, is not inte in her family affairs or her children. quite recently the case *for* fertility has been stated. All this is true. There is fore ample room for propaganda.

* Carr-Saunders, A. M., *loc. cit.*, 16.

* *loc. cit.*, 17.

ntributor will make a donation nless he has been convinced that hy cause. But there are many recognize the worthiness of the out feeling that they are in a make any contribution them- re is therefore a danger in speak- he *duty* of parenthood without ly providing for the *rights* of children. As Dr. McCleary has we may get the retort : " What y ever done for me that I should to it ? " It is dangerous to talk f selfishness as a cause of family when what some call selfishness by others as plain common sense, a strong sense of responsibility, vents a married couple from to the world more children than hey can bring up in health and Who is to say that their standards high ?

regard to propaganda, we shall ose what emphasis to place upon als, and to which sections of the they should be mainly directed. ling is that, since we are soliciting contributions, we should do what cit charity for good causes do, and appeals mainly to the better-off would perhaps be a little rash to , from the eugenic point of view, he most valuable sections of the , but at any rate they are not by the least valuable. The fact that lso the least fertile groups seems that they require special atten-

nerically they are less important great mass of wage-earners. In o some sections of the latter ill entertain misgivings about the y of any indiscriminate exhorta- ility. For my own part I feel that se the creation of conditions for birth-release is more impor- ropaganda, and that any positive t go hand in hand with birth- eugenic enlightenment, and that, easible, eugenic safeguards should ated in the programme.

Objectives of birth-promotion measures

What should be the material basis of propaganda for birth promotion ? At present the needs of society clash with the private interests of the individual married couple. The aim of a positive policy must therefore be to resolve this conflict of interests. It seems to me that there must be two main objectives :

1. To reduce the extent to which child-bearing and -rearing is dependent upon what Miss Rathbone calls the " rough and tumble of wage negotiations," by providing the family with a source of income other than the earnings of its breadwinner, an additional income, independent and distinct from wages, which will vary according to the size of the dependent family. By an additional source of income I do not merely imply cash allowances. I include, as I have already explained, every form of " horizontal redistribution "—rent rebates, school-feeding, improved maternity and medical services, differential pricing schemes, taxation, and so forth.

2. The second objective should be to ensure that every child that is brought into the world is guaranteed an adequate basic minimum of food, clothing, shelter and medical care. I incline to the view that poverty at the bottom of the social scale is likely, in these days of voluntary parenthood, to prove more and more a deterrent to fertility. At any rate there should be a revision of the absurd social accountancy which provides that ten times as much money should be spent weekly on a mentally defective child as on the (potentially) healthy child of an unemployed worker.

To sum up my two objectives into one formula : everything possible should be done gradually to reduce the extent to which the fate of the nation's children is bound up with the struggle for economic welfare and social advancement of their parents.

Many less fundamental lines of reform come to mind.

1. The social services must be reorganized so as to incorporate the family as a unit. This applies especially to National Health

Insurance, which to this very day continues to exclude the dependent family of the insured worker from the benefits he enjoys. A chain of community centres, on the lines of the Pioneer Health Centre in Peckham, might well be founded, to act as centres for prophylaxis and at the same time as centres for encouraging "neighbourliness" on a family basis, and generally creating an atmosphere in which family ties are strengthened and family troubles dissipated.

2. Our towns should be purged of the harmful features which discourage fertility. Housing accommodation suited to the needs of large families, nurseries and crèches where infants can be safely parked when parents go out to shop or to enjoy themselves, playgrounds, parks, green belts, and much besides are needed before our towns will be fit for children to live in.

3. There is probably considerable scope for preferential treatment of parents of large families, not merely in differential pricing of railway fares, electricity, etc., in the vision of free holiday accommodatio wireless sets, and so forth, but also, *paribus*, in the allocation of employ This is a controversial matter upon w the experience of Germany and Italy throw some light.

The foregoing are merely the sort of p which my Committee will probably be sidering in the near future. What deci will be taken I cannot of course forecas

I conclude with a suggestion. I have touched upon the question of the natu the eugenic safeguards which it would advisable to incorporate in such a popula programme. It would be highly interes to learn the opinions of members of *Society* as to the kind of measures w would be necessary to ensure that expansion of the birth-rate shall not h eugenically undesirable consequences. recommend this point as a topic for fu reflection to all members of the *Society*.